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James Green

In 1995 the Service
setts
in

human

Employees International Union Local 509 and four Massachu-

service providers signed an unusual agreement to forge a partnership

which employers would remain neutral while the union approached

its

workers

with an offer to advocate in the state legislature for greater funding for private

human

service employees

and

to

promote cooperative relations with

their

employ-

and the pressures on public
employee unions and small human service providers whose workforce copes with
low wages, high turnover, meager benefits, and poor public image as well as the
give-and-take between union and employer representatives and their effort to provide representation for a growing number of poorly paid, often part-time human
ers.

This study examines the context of the agreement

service workers.

Prologue

At a well-attended press conference held at the Boston Park Plaza Hotel on December
14, 1995, those present heard an announcement of the creation of a new partnership
between Local 509 of the Service Employees International Union (SEIU) and several
Massachusetts private agencies that offer mental health and retardation services. This
revelation heralded a unique development in the history of labor relations. Prior to engaging in collective bargaining, a group of private employers agreed to work with a
union to raise incomes for employees and to allow the union to organize the employees
without interference. Indeed, the union representatives and providers met frequently and
intensively for many months. Both parties engaged in serious discussions without violating the rules set by the National Labor Relations Act, which prohibit actual negotiations prior to the recognition of a duly constituted collective bargaining unit. These
discussions bore fruit, producing a format for future bargaining and future contracts
between a union and a consortium of employers.

is professor of labor studies and acting director of the Labor Resource CenCollege of Public and Community Service, University of Massachusetts Boston.
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The proceedings were chaired by Hubie Jones, senior fellow

McCormack

Institute at the University of

John W.

at the

Massachusetts Boston,

who

facilitated the

meetings of the providers and the union in 1994 and 1995. The event attracted special

John W. Sweeney, who two months earlier had been
AFL-CIO and had previously, as president of the SEIU,

attention because of the presence of

elected the

new

president of the

encouraged and promoted Local 509's

efforts to create a partnership

with the employers.

Sweeney described the signing of the agreement as a "historic moment" of "immense
importance for the labor movement, for the employer community, for the human service
provider community, and for those who believe in the public sector's responsibility for
the most unfortunate among us." He said that organized labor was committed to "building bridges" whenever the "shelling stops" and employers cease attacking unions. Now,
he declared, some visionary providers had agreed to cease fire and to create "a peace"
beneficial to labor and management.
In exchange for employers allowing employees to

make

a "truly free choice" in a

union election without discouragement from management, Local 509 committed

forming a new partnership with national backing from SEIU and the AFL-CIO.
ees chose to be represented by SEIU,

If

Sweeney explained, the union would enter

itself to

employinto a

multiemployer agreement based on a shared commitment to provide highest-quality care
for the agencies in the

most

cost-effective ways.

Unions would respect the challenge of

providing quality care in such a difficult environment as well as management's right to

make

necessary decisions; the employers would respect the union's obligation to repre-

sent employees. Four agencies and their boards had, in Sweeney's words,

ment

to their

made

a commit-

employees and overcome "old-fashioned notions of management preroga-

tives" to forge a

tion pay off for

new

partnership. Organized labor, always concerned to

members, wanted

to

make

it

make

unioniza-

pay off for these agencies and for the people

they serve. 1

What brought
employers

it

together a public employee union and

was accustomed

to fighting at this historic

a union and representatives of

have prevailed

in

management

many workplaces

to

some of the private, nonunion
moment? What process allowed

overcome the adversarial relations

during the past two decades?

What

that

are the goals of

the partnership for providing quality care, for achieving efficiency and excellence, and
for improving the

What

working

lives of underpaid, highly transient, direct-care

workers?

implications does the partnership hold for public policy, for labor law, and for the

process of collective bargaining in the private

human

service sector?

I

address these

questions through an examination of the contexts in which the partnership

and of the forces and motives

that brought the parties together

and problems involved and the potential gains

to

was formed

and analyze the issues

be achieved by

all

parties in

human

services.

Contexts

During the 1950s, relatives of patients and human service professionals called for an end
to "warehousing" people in large institutions and for the creation of

In 1963 Congress

made

community

care

community-based
settings, and in 1966 the Massachusetts Legislature enacted Chapter 735, the Comprehensive Mental Health and Retardation Services Act, which mandated state agencies to
create community care facilities and to move people out of the large state institutions. In
1966 the commonwealth of Massachusetts devoted 8 percent of its annual budget to the

facilities.

federal funds available to create

188

care and housing of
the retarded

—

the

more than 26,000 people

mental hospitals and schools for

in state

Department of Mental Retardation alone employed 16,000 workers.

Deinstitutionalization took place slowly over a period of years and began to reduce the
2
large workforce in state facilities.

Public employee unions, which had originated in some of these institutions, pro-

members' jobs. 3 But these protests did not halt the deinstitutwhich enjoyed strong public and government support. The courts ordered

tested the loss of their
ionalization,

community-based

facilities to

deinstitutionalized people.

on

state contracts to

A

provide alternative but adequate care for

number of

private,

mainly nonprofit agencies began to bid

provide services for the mentally

Some

based, mainly nonunion settings.

ill

and disabled

in

community-

of the providers were former employees of the

state-funded agencies that offered such services.

Some viewed

privatization as an op-

portunity to apply their ideas for improved treatment and care in settings free of
state regulations

some

and union contract provisions.

During the 1960s and 1970s, deinstitutionalization was largely driven by a concern
for the quality of care attainable in large state-run settings and a belief that services

delivered through smaller operations located in or near recipients'

own neighborhoods

would be more humane and more effective. Although implementation of communitybased care for the mentally ill and mentally retarded was often limited by inadequate
funding, the promise of improved care through deinstitutionalization retained strong
support

among

professionals, recipients, and advocates.

In 1990 Massachusetts governor William
feasibility of closing several of the

Weld

established a

commission

remaining institutions operated by the

to study the

state

Depart-

ments of Mental Health and Mental Retardation. The panel recommended closing nine
mental health

facilities

and public health hospitals over a period of three years, saving

$144 million initially and $60 million annually. The administration promised
to encourage the new private contractors to hire some of the workers employed at the
nine institutions. In its first six months in office the Weld administration laid off 3, 000
mental health and retardation workers; it is not clear how many found employment in the
the state

private agencies.

For most employees of state institutions, closing the hospitals and state "schools"
meant layoffs and uncertainty. For those who sought work in the private sector the
change meant a move from large, highly structured workplaces with union pay scales
and negotiated labor-management relations to a varied set of working conditions and a

new

set

of employers

who

often underbid one another for state contracts.

The workers employed by

private vendors in the mental health and retardation fields

who work in group homes or halfway houses as well as
and treatment programs. About 25 percent are professionals who provide

are primarily paraprofessionals

day

activity

in

treatment such as group therapy and psychotherapy, physical and occupational therapy,

and

crisis intervention.

care workers
tasks.

who

The majority of the workforce

— 65 percent —

consists of direct-

help clients eat, bathe, dress, and carry out daily living and working

The remainder

consists of clerical and maintenance personnel.

Although some former

state

employees migrated

to the private sector, the privatiza-

tion of mental health and retardation services has created a new, largely nonunion

work-

more part-time employment, and higher turnsome agencies, according to some sources. 4 One re-

force with lower wages, fewer benefits,

over

—

as high as 66 percent in

search report estimates that in about 1,400 Massachusetts private agencies, 60,000

workers, 65 percent female, provide

human

services,
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between 18,000

to

25,000 of them
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mental health and mental retardation in 300 agencies.

A

survey of 125 large vendors

reported a force of 84 percent non-Hispanic white workers,
black, 3 percent Hispanic,

Wages and

and

1

benefits for these private-sector workers are

those of the public employees in the field.

workers

1 1

percent non-Hispanic

percent Asian. 5

The

20

to

40 percent lower than

starting salary for private direct-care

$14,500 compared with $19,450 for public employees. The benefits available
employees also differ from those of public employees. Indeed, many private

is

to private

week for benefit eligibility hire many workers on
makes them ineligible. An estimated 5 to 15 percent
of these employees are part-time "relief workers, and perhaps half the remaining
workforce is employed part time for necessary nighttime and evening coverage. 6
The privately employed human service workers in Massachusetts represent a good
example of the national trend toward "contingent" work. The growth of irregular work
is characterized by the transformation of the workforce, the decline of real wages and
the loss of benefits, instability of employment, and a declining standard of living among
the working poor, who are predominantly female and people of color, native born and
immigrant. The growth of contingent labor also raises serious public policy questions
because many government policies and regulations, for example, the Fair Labor Stan7
dards Act, may not cover those who work irregularly. Critics charged that Massachusetts private agencies are not obeying state and federal labor regulations and that some
workers are overworked and not paid for their full time. 8
Massachusetts private providers receive 80 to 100 percent of their budget from state
funding. In fiscal year 1993 the Department of Mental Retardation served or supported
25,528 clients in residential, day, and work programs and half the department's budget of
$313 million was allocated to private vendors. Wages for Massachusetts direct-care
workers in the private sector had been frozen since 1988. Private providers interviewed
for this study expressed deep concern over this dilemma and the various negative consequences it creates, like high turnover. They also worried about the lack of benefits, like
pensions, as well as training funds and programs for their employees. According to huagencies that require a thirty-five-hour

a less than full-time basis, which

man
tive

many private providers regarded their funding
human service workers" on the part of the legisla-

service professor Elaine Werby,

dilemma

as a sign of "disrespect for

and executive branches of

state

government. 9

Besides their deep concerns about funding,

human

service providers expressed anxi-

managed care trend in government contracting. The Weld administration
contracted with one company to provide managed care for all Medicaid mental health
clients and human service professionals. Policy analysts, including Dr. Murray Frank of
ety about the

the University of Massachusetts Boston, report that this trend worried

human

service providers

who

feared that larger corporations

many

would bid

smaller

low, cut costs,

and force the smaller agencies to merge or to close their doors.

Labor unions representing human service workers in the public sector strenuously
resisted the trend

toward privatization, which cost many members

their jobs.

As one

employer indicated, privatization in Massachusetts did move jobs off the state
payroll to eliminate the costs of pensions and wage increases. The resistance to contracting out government services reflected larger efforts by public- sector unions engaged in

private

difficult political battles against tax cuts,

budget cuts, and contracting out as well as

demands for concessions in the bargaining process.
A low point for Massachusetts unions came in 1980, when a referendum limiting local
property tax rates, Proposition 2Vi, received an electoral majority. As a result, massive
struggles against public employers'

190

budget cuts created drastic layoffs of local public servants. 10 Public employee unions

were handicapped
in the

in their struggle to survive

by the consistently unfavorable coverage

media, which contributed to a lack of public support.

human

representing

A

Massachusetts attorney

service providers expressed the opinion that public sector unions

were simply "unpopular."

The Service Employees International Union, whose locals represented many state
human service workers in Massachusetts, met these challenges, first with an effective
coalition

campaign

referendum

to defeat a drastic tax-cutting

in 1990. It also

measure put forward

in a statewide

opposed privatization with an aggressive public campaign.

Sandy Felder, then president of SEIU Local 509, a statewide union representing social
work professionals and other human service workers, said her organization did not insist
that only public service workers could provide services. The local opposed privatization
because it led to the "firing of state workers," reducing union membership, and to "the
reduction of standards, wages, and benefits for the privatized work force." The local sued

Weld

the

administration to prevent the hiring of laid-off state workers at considerably

pay and

less

benefits. Felder told the

Boston Globe that "Weld has a vision of selling

any vision of what

state

government

state

should provide." The union also charged that "there was a

to the lowest bidder without

sort of services the

lot

of fraud and lack of

oversight" in the private agencies. Local 509 organized a Vendor Waste
out what

The

it

by

local energetically supported a bill sponsored

when passed over Governor Weld's

which,

Watch

to point

regarded as waste and fraud. 11
state senator

Mark Pacheco,

veto, restricted privatization.

The union's

aggressive struggle against privatization contributed to what one of the larger providers,

Sheldon Bycoff, head of Vinfen Corporation, called a "long-standing history of mistrust"

on the part of private agencies and

their

had already opposed unions

boards toward Local 509. However, many pro-

Although publicfew community-based agencies in Massachusetts, they
experienced determined opposition from many private human service employers. The
viders

in principle as well as in practice.

sector unions did organize a

Mental Retardation Providers Association issued an advisory strongly opposing unionization,

which

it

believed

would "demoralize the workforce through the assessment of

dues, the absence of consumer-focused values, and increased opportunities for divisive-

ness within provider agencies." 12
Private

human

service providers

opposing unionization.

An

and

their consultants attended meetings focused

attorney retained

by Massachusetts providers

on

said that labor

from an agency head who said, "I am being organized, I
my work sites
and you're gonna help me stop
this. You're gonna help me work with middle management and top management around
what we can and can't do under the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) rules and
other applicable rules regarding workers' right to organize." One agency director,
Chuck Howard, recalled being very "uncomfortable" in the meetings he attended with
other directors "to learn how to fight union organizing." He thought the union was addressing real employee concerns. "If there hadn't been so much involved in figuring out
how to start and run a nonprofit and manage it and deliver all of the services that were
part of it, we probably would have evolved to a more enlightened relationship with our

relations lawyers received calls

hear there's literature being sent to

.

.

.

employees."
Public employee unions, in their attempts to organize privatized workers, faced

some

of the same obstacles as unions in other areas of the economy. Antiunion opposition

grew

after 1981,

when

President Reagan broke the air traffic controllers' strike and
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terminated union members as federal employees. During the 1980s, employers either
violated federal labor law to resist unionization or found

courage

NLRB

The

it.

ways within

the law to dis-

allowed employers to hold "captive meetings" during work

hours, issuing antiunion propaganda and intimidating,
porters and threatening to close

up shop

if

if

not terminating, union sup-

employees chose unions. Even when a

majority of workers signed cards authorizing a union election, employers used the
intervening period to discourage those

who had

called for a union. In the 1980s the

percentage of union victories in elections declined as did the percentage of eligible

who belonged to unions. 13
Like other unions, SEIU faced serious

workers

challenges caused by employer opposition,

the failure of labor law, a changing workforce, an altered state of labor relations, and a

Two decades of crisis discredited many of the old methods
and gave rise to new ideas about organizing, servicing, bargaining, and cooperating
with management. The crisis of the 1980s also provoked a recognition of the need for
different political climate.

strategic choices about the

decisions about

maximum

how

campaigns

to organize

impact with fewer resources. 14 This

CIO's decision

to create

and fund a new

cadre of organizers trained in

SEIU

that unions

new workers,

new

mounted. Unions faced

to fight concessions,

difficult

and to make a

strategic turn is reflected in the

institute

whose goal was

to recruit a

AFL-

young

tactics.

has been in the forefront of several innovative organizing campaigns directed

toward sectors

that

were

difficult to organize.

SEIU debated

Since

many

struggles against

after some conemployed service workers. In so doing, the union drew
upon the lessons of the civil rights movement, the women's movement, and community organizations to approach service workers, whose numbers include more women
and people of color than the industrial workforce. 15 In the mid-eighties SEIU launched
an aggressive drive, Justice for Janitors, among privately employed janitors by regenerating the unions' organizing capacity and devising new tactics aimed at service

privatization failed,

alternative strategies

and decided,

troversy, to organize privately

workers. 16

Unions organizing service workers and attempting to secure an election supervised
the NLRB faced problems of high turnover, largely attributable to low pay and few
chances for advancement. These problems severely handicapped the usual process of

by

organizing a union by obtaining signatures from sufficient numbers of workers to call

an election administered by the

would ultimately be included

NLRB. Although

any workers in the bargaining unit

in a negotiated union contract, only those

employed

at

the time of the election could vote for certification of the union as bargaining agent.

Given the high turnover

rate,

providers hostile to the union could

stall

the election

with procedural issues, expecting that enough eligible workers would leave their emto invalidate the NLRB election. Faced with this dilemma, some unions
began using a blitz campaign, which puts pressure on an employer to recognize a
union as soon as a "card check" indicates that a majority favor unionization. 17

ployment

Proposing a

The 1990

New Model

election of Republican William

Weld and subsequent

drastic reduction of

the state's Department of Labor and Industries caused labor unions even

more concern

about their future. Although the Democrats retained majorities in both houses of the
legislature,

and the union remained

influential with

192

many of

those representatives, the

future of public

employee unionism seemed most problematic

efforts to cut taxes

and shrink

state

government.

It

also

as a result of

became

clear to

Weld's

many

public

employee unions that, even with the Pacheco bill, privatization would continue and that
it would be difficult to reverse the process.
In 1993 Sandy Felder and other Local 509 leaders began to focus on the need to
organize the workers employed by private contractors. She believed that this task could
be accomplished only on a large scale, that it would "be easier to organize the workers
if

the providers

were

neutralized," and that the process might involve

some "mutual

gains bargaining" because, despite the "history of mistrust," the union and provider

community shared common needs.
Felder also began discussions with public policy advocates and public officials con-

human

cerning "the anomalous situation" of privately employed

wages were paid by
employers with

little

Dunlop of Harvard

service workers

government but who were largely subjected

the

government regulation. She brought

whose

to private control

this situation to

by

Professor John

University, distinguished labor relations expert, former secretary of

Commission on

labor and chair of President Bill Clinton's

the Future of

Worker/Manage-

ment Relations. Felder described the difficult position of the direct-care workers employed by a myriad of private service agencies,
ture

and governor for compensation

levels

phasized the problems of privatized workers
that lacked rights

under

state labor relations

by federal law. She explained

to Dunlop:

all

dependent on the will of the

legisla-

and other employment conditions. She em-

who
and

are part of a "secondary workforce"
private- sector labor relations

"When you go

governed

to negotiate a contract with the

we can't do any more because the state controls our
But then you try to go to the state labor relations, and they'd say, 'Wait. They're
a private entity.' So that in the end these workers are getting stuck in the middle." This
dilemma created by privatization "intrigued" Dunlop, who asked Felder to testify at the
federal government commission hearing he would chair in Boston on January 6, 1994.
Dunlop advised Felder to open discussions of this dilemma with providers and to get

private agencies, they'd say, 'Well,

budget.'

a "neutral" to facilitate the dialogue.

He

also advised her to "keep the lawyers out of the

room." During the spring of 1994 Felder began meeting with a number of directors of

Leavy of Communities for People,
of Bay Cove Human Services. She
advanced her ideas about a cooperative relationship that would help raise the abysmal
state-funded, nonprofit agencies, including Joe

Michael

Donham

of Center House, and

Dan Boynton

salary level in the field and provide the union with a chance to approach employees

when Local
Community Care Workers Campaign, to promote
a multiemployer partnership based on a new cooperative model of labor relations. The
campaign's "deeper purpose" was to create a "seamless web" in the delivery of mental

without employer opposition. The union's approach soon became public

509 launched an organizing

drive, the

health and mental retardation services in Massachusetts.
In private discussions with providers, the union asked employers to remain neutal

and allow the union

to contact workers. If the

employers remained neutral, the union

could help lobby the government to fund increases in their workers' wages. During this
concentrated blitz of a few weeks' duration, Local 509 members volunteered to contact

nonunion workers and

to distribute a questionnaire

on working conditions. Only 150

responses were returned, indicating that 82 percent saw no opportunity for career adless that $20,000 a year, 62 percent received no addipay for overtime, and 60 percent said they received insufficient training. Employer reactions to the campaign varied. According to one study, most providers "told

vancement, 75 percent earned
tional
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workers not to

The

let

the union in" and

some "made

particular difficulties of organizing privatized

many union

the obstacles faced by

threats of retaliation."

human

18

service workers parallel

organizing drives. Unions that try to organize often

who

face tough opposition from employers

hire antiunion legal

and consulting firms.

These "union busters" combine hard-hitting practices meant to intimidate union sympathizers in the

workforce with complex legal maneuvers meant to wear

gies of union staff

and exhaust union resources. In the

late

down

the ener-

1970s and 1980s, such union

avoidance strategy led to increases in firings for union activities and in more unfair
labor practice charges being filed.

19

Not only did antiunion employers

actively discour-

age employees from unionizing, they refused to engage in good faith bargaining for
contracts even after a majority of employees voted to join a union.
lost trust in the traditional

this tradition

Campaign and

its

ways of gaining recognition and a first contract.
Community Care Workers

of employer opposition, Local 509's

outreach to private providers represented a departure from SEIU's past

practice of organizing public workers

found

it

first

a result, unions

time-consuming, frustrating process of organizing and bar-

gaining and sought more direct

Given

As

and opposing

idea that "the

difficult to accept the

Most union

privatization.

enemy wasn't

activists

the providers," that the

power was in the hands of the governor and the legislature, and that unionists in Local
509 saw themselves "more as allies with the providers than as enemies." The idea of
approaching employers about organizing privatized workers aroused a lively debate
within union circles.

Some argued

that

it

would violate the National Labor Relations

Act's provisions against union bargaining with
gible workers

management before a majority of

had chosen the union to represent them. In seeking

eli-

to build relationships

with the provider community, Local 509 could not overstep the boundary between establishing a safe organizing environment and conducting contract negotiations before

became

human

it

the duly constituted bargaining agent. Others thought the idea of persuading

service

management

to

remain neutral was simply naive.

Still

others felt that the

Union had betrayed its members who remained commonwealth employees and that the union would be unable to represent the interests of
both sets of workers fairly. However, SEIU national president John Sweeney supported
Service Employees International

the departure

from past practice and encouraged Local 509's

initiative.

Concerned with the criticism that unionized public workers are

inefficient,

Sweeney

promoted a new model of public sector unionism, which presents unions as guarantors
of quality services. SEIU's Public Division proclaimed a primary goal of enabling "pubat work and
commission on the public sector
in 1994, Sweeney argued that the achievement of excellence in public service would
require "meaningful worker participation in all levels of decision making concerning
the design and delivery of public service." 20
Addressing the growth of nonunion workers doing public work through private employers, Sweeney asserted that cooperation would be impossible without protection
afforded to workers who would fear reprisals if they challenged or questioned management decisions. "When employees are afforded the necessary assurances and protections,
they typically welcome the opportunity to work with management to achieve greater
lic

workers to act as advocates for effective and responsive public service,

in the public policy arena." Testifying before a federal

Sweeney maintained, the public would benefit
between low wages and poor benefits in the private service

efficiency in government." Ultimately,

from reducing the
and the public

differential

sector.

He

expanded scope of collective
would not be possible. Subjects like

also suggested that without an

bargaining, genuine labor- management cooperation

194

agency mission, not usually subjects of bargaining, would have
that

to be put

on the table so

employees are "true partners" with managers. 21
It is

increasingly

common

for unions and

mittees around workplace issues.

management

also increasingly

It is

to participate in joint

common

unionized firms to establish vehicles for worker participation

making.

Some union and academic

critics

employers

for

some kinds of

in

comnon-

at

decision

argue that these forms of participation are

deceptive efforts to give employees a sense of involvement that will stave off unionization efforts. Employer-initiated efforts have

Labor Relations Act

ing the National

become

prohibition on

controversial since they risk violat-

"company

unions," including

em-

ployer-dominated committees. 22

However, in the industrial-union sector organizations

United Auto Wokers

like the

have entered joint decision-making programs with management; and some public-sector
unions have supported joint labor-management committees to devise ways of providing
better,

more

Many

cost-effective services as an alternative to privatization.

way

pose union participation in management as a

unions pro-

of addressing a number of problems:

increasing quality of care, consumer satisfaction, and public support; reducing conflict

and adversarial union-management relations in workplaces as well
and reducing turnover

in the workforce.

improving training

as

23

who

Powerful motivations led President Felder to reach out to providers
interested in a

new model

of labor-management relations in the

aware of public policy analysts

who

human

might be

She was

services.

argued that the growth of part-time or contingent

One

labor required a change in union strategies as well as public policies.

study urged

unions to reevaluate their antagonism toward nontraditional forms of employment and
to focus instead

on combining innovative

collective bargaining with public policies that

"can control employer abuses of part-time and contingent work arrangement, extend the
benefit of flexibility to as wide a group as possible, and supplement employer-provided
fringe benefits

From the

— even though

these policies

unions appear less necessary." 24

some were

providers' side, strong opposition to unions remained, but

to talk to the

willing

union representatives, especially those who were heavily dependent on

state contracts

and were

frustrated

Riley, executive director of Better
legislative

may make

by the wage freeze
Community Living

committee on human services lacked

appropriately. This

was

for direct-care workers.

New

in

Bedford,

trust in the providers to

reflected in the budget freeze after 1988.

Then

Tom

felt that the

spend funds

in 1993,

when

a

budget increase did not even get out of a conference committee, a red flag went up, and
Riley

became even more concerned about

He began

attending the

McCormack

the "political process" involved in budgeting.

Institute

Forum meetings

with Local 509 after he

received calls from people in his community, including legislators, encouraging him to
participate.

came

He had begun working

in the field at a time

when

staff salary increases

regularly but during the long budget freeze he realized that his staff

able to increase their pay without "as

bly get." "I looked

much

on the horizon and

I

didn't see a lot of people

.

.

our agency," he added, "but the union was knocking on the door and

and

talk to staff.

Used

would not be

public support as the agencies could possi-

to dealing with unionized public servants as a

.

willing to support
said come on
member of his

I

in"

local school committee, Riley thought that collective bargaining might give legislators

more confidence
"be assured that

make

that budget increases
it's

would actually go

not going to be misspent."

He

the whole budgeting process and the process of

sonable."

195

to the direct-care workers

and

thought the union might be able to

wage determination more

"rea-
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Sandy Felder's argument on behalf of the union addressed the providers' concern
with elevating wages and the legislature's concern that additional funds might not be
spent on direct-care workers. In the long run, she hoped, the legislature would see that
makes sense to take responsibility for the privatized workforce in mental health and
mental retardation. Contracting out the services would not absolve government of its
responsibility to the workforce and the clients. "Wouldn't it be better," she asked, "to
have some standards and some knowledge of how much money" these workers will

money

receive instead of "just throwing

they choose?

The

legislature

who can spend

out to providers"

it

any way

needed a systematic way of getting the money out there

the workers through the agencies, she maintained.

"And why not have

it

to

that systematic

way come through collective bargaining?" With a contract the government would have
make sure the funding ended up in the pay of direct-care workers, thus giving

the union
the

government more control over

its

spending on these programs.

Besides organizing a more powerful lobbying group and creating a better system for

pay direct-care workers, the union saw another advantage in a

the state to

multiemployer agreement. The geographical dispersion of 300 agencies created problems for the union in terms of organizing, bargaining, and

staffing.

nizing had to proceed on an agency-by-agency basis, but the union

For Local 509, orga-

hoped

for a master

many, agencies under one umbrella. The preference for a multiemployer bargaining process shaped the union's approach from the
beginning. The multiemployer framework was seen not only as a way to streamline
contract administration; it could also achieve certain economies of scale. "The idea,"

would bring

contract that

"was

said Felder,

all,

or

at least

them together

to bring

group of providers, so that

we

collectively

and

to

amass their power as one

then [could] go to lobby to get funding or get them to

share health insurance or workers' compensation or training. ... If they
in a

multiemployer agreement, they can share things as well. So

an added

.

.

.

we

come

felt that

together

would be

value to the workers of the agency."

Seeking to escape the old adversarial model without abandoning a commitment to
aggressive organizing, President Felder decided to reach out publicly to private provid-

Based on her conversations with providers, the support of
someone to convene a meeting of unions and providers. She thought the union would need someone it
could trust but also "someone of stature who could bring providers to the table with us."

ers to seek a partnership.

President Sweeney, and Professor Dunlop's advice, Felder looked for

Negotiating a

New

Partnership

After preliminary discussions with providers, Felder and others agreed that Hubie Jones

was the best choice
Social

Work

at

to facilitate a process

of dialogue. The former dean of the School of

Boston University and an influential voice in

political affairs,

Jones

enjoyed the authority and respect required to bring together diverse parties in the
service world.

As

senior fellow at the John

W. McCormack

Institute

the University of Massachusetts Boston, he maintained a strong interest in

vices

and public

policy.

success, he
sity

McCormack

human

at

ser-

After consideration of Felder's request for assistance in work-

ing with the provider community, Jones offered to conduct a
ship of the

human

of Public Affairs

Institute

beginning in the

fall

forum under the sponsorfirst meeting was a

of 1994. If the

would plan more gatherings. For many providers the

setting at the Univer-

of Massachusetts in Boston offered a neutral ground where issues could be explored

with civility and caution.
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Jones sought the assistance of two other

Murray Frank. Werby and Frank

Werby and Dr.
human services as

institute fellows, Dr. Elaine

also had distinguished careers in

administrators and teachers and both had been affiliated with the University of Massa-

Community Service, a school that educates
Werby was a professor in the Human Services
Center and Frank was the dean, a position he assumed after working for public employee unions in New York. The institute fellows played important facilitating and mechusetts Boston's College of Public and

human

service workers and labor leaders.

diating roles in an unprecedented process of bringing together institutional actors dedi-

cated to the well-being of their constituencies, yet potentially and actually in conflict

with each other. According to Frank,

who

chaired

many

ate role for a public university with a service mission

meetings, this was an appropri-

and an urban agenda.

Frank and Werby both emphasized the unique quality of the dialogue they

facili-

The parties had no experience of coming together outside the labor-management
framework and both sides harbored strong feelings about "the other side." Both parties
tated.

took considerable risks in getting to the

table. Indeed, the providers

who

participated

did so without the support of their boards of directors, whose members usually opposed

unions strenuously; they even faced, as Frank put
tors

and peers

The

it,

a degree of scorn from other direc-

in their field.

union's energetic efforts to invite providers from across the state to these meet-

ings, along with 509's

the forefront

among

ongoing organizing

drive,

brought the issue of unionization to

the providers themselves. According to

director of the Massachusetts Council of

Human

Boyce Slayman, executive
was

Service Providers, the council

Some members wanted to endorse the process of
way at the McCormack Institute to see if it would "result in getting
workers more money" and to see if the new model the union proposed would work.
Some wanted the council to oppose the union. As Slayman explained, "In some cases
providers had been unionized before, but the members had voted them out," while in
others, which had not been unionized, managers and board members believed "that

beset by two opposing points of view.
exploration under

unions invest tremendous resources in keeping bad workers on the job." Furthermore,
these antiunion pro-viders refused "to submit to any more rules and regulations than

.

.

.

absolutely necessary."

The McCormack Institute Forum "The Future of the Human Services Workforce"
was announced in a mailing to a wide variety of interested parties, including providers
in the mental heath and retardation field, public officials, and academics. The forum
organizers were surprised to find approximately thirty agencies represented at the meetings in the

fall

of 1994 and through the winter and spring of 1995.

Their motivations varied.

Many

the budget freeze and the low

Howard

of Cooperative

wage

Human

of the providers in attendance shared a concern over
level of their direct-care workers.

Some,

like

Chuck

Services, had lost confidence in the capacity of provid-

ers "to lobby the legislature to get funding."

Some

providers

who

expressed interest

believed their competitors were underbidding them for state contracts by paying lower

wages. The union clearly appealed to the providers to create a

common

standard on

wages, and to take wages out of competition. Some, as Hubie Jones suggested, were

concerned

that the union's organizing drive

their agencies.

knew

One

that ten of his

would lead

to conflicts that

would harm

executive director, Larry Urban of the Renaissance Club in Lowell,

workers had expressed

with organizers from

SEIU Local

interest in unionizing after

509. Unlike

many

making contact

employers, he was not worried about

the presence of the union organizers in the workplace because "our door has been wide
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open" for a discussion of any new programs or ideas.

"It

was not something

an intrusion, but just part of the open decision-making process that

.

.

.

felt

I

was

has always gone

on here."
all

Urban was concerned, however, about the implications of unionization for "the overoperation of the agency." Since organizing was already going on among direct-care

workers in his area, he decided to attend the

first

meeting

at the

McCormack

Institute to

was "all about" and to discuss a partnership that would not be based on
the "traditional model" of adversarial relations in which employers are "compelled to
come to the table" by the union. Urban hoped the new-model partnership could have a
positive goal of "empowering workers" through improved training and programs to
allow them to cooperate more effectively with employers who would have an added
advantage of participating in a multiemployer organization that would benefit all partfind out

what

it

ners.

The response to the first meeting of the Human Services Workforce Forum on November 16, 1994, was encouraging to the sponsors. The approximately thirty providers
who attended heard a number of presentations, including one by Philip Johnston, regional director of the federal Department of Health and Human Services, and former
secretary of human services for Massachusetts. He articulated the widely held view that
the low salary levels of direct-care workers in the field had caused a major crisis for
human service agencies and their clients.
Jones thought that "the first meeting went very well" because there was "straight talk
from human service providers" who had felt burned by "some union tactics and behavior." Providers expressed their concerns over the union's campaigns against privatization, its efforts to expose contractor abuses, and what some employers believed to be
the protection of incompetent workers under union contracts. But they also made it
clear, said Jones, that "if they didn't work out some collaborative way of embracing
each other, they were going to kill each other off." Furthermore, "they weren't going to
get anywhere with the legislature in terms of getting more money."
A summary of the first meeting listed the following issues as the main topics of discussion:
efforts

first,

the hostile political climate for providers and workers alike; second, the

of the governor to pit

publicity generated

by

state

workers against privatized workers;

hostile infighting

the level of funding of mental health

among human

third, the

negative

service interest groups; fourth,

and retardation budgets leading

to lower

wages,

fewer benefits, higher turnover, and low morale.

The meeting reached a decision
stop and that "the only
ing conditions,

is

way

that the infighting within

to increase fiscal

to organize a

and

human

political support,

new model of provider-worker

services

had

to

and improve work-

cooperation."

One model

proposed by Local 509 was that the union represent all private workers and negotiate
one contract on their behalf, which would also increase the bargaining power of the
union with the state legislature and allow providers to organize together more effec-

The main problem with such a model was that it required trust from both sides,
and some providers expressed the view that collective bargaining was adversarial by
nature and promoted distrust; thinking that conflict might produce strikes, they wanted

tively.

no-strike clauses; they also believed unions defended workers "to the hilt" in grievance

procedures and placed management

at

a disadvantage.

The

providers' concern that

union contracts and grievance procedures protected incompetent or abusive workers
surfaced as a serious issue and would remain so.

Over the course of

this

meeting and those that followed, the union's representatives
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offered their

new model of labor-management

political influence to the

with providers

campaign

who made

cooperation and pledged their formidable

The union expressed deep concern

to raise wages.

serious efforts to dissuade their employees from joining

unions; therefore, Service Employees International Union participants wanted to

whether employers would enter an agreement
proached employees, allowing them

The mood

know

to remain neutral while the union ap-

choose for themselves.

to

created by the forum in the

fall

of 1994 encouraged hopes that the process

move from tentative overtures to real commitments. Jones extended an invitation
use the McCormack Institute as a meeting venue and offered to broaden the efforts

could
to

and Werby were making to facilitate the process.
The forum decided to create two subcommittees, one to work on

he, Frank,

and the other

to focus

on a strategy to lobby the

a model agreement

legislature for the first increase in

Men-

Health and Mental Retardation funding in seven years. However, disagreement be-

tal

tween the union and the providers led to the dissolution of the second subcommittee,
and the union pursued its own course in lobbying for the increase during the spring of
1995. The union and the providers engaged in separate lobbying to increase funding for
human service employees. The overall effort, which joined that of human service advo-

cacy groups, led to an important public policy debate on the consequences of
deinstitutionalization and privatization.

In 1993 the administration of Governor William

Weld issued a

report praising the

"dramatic savings" resulting from the privatization of human services. Yet the privatized

workers

who

staffed deinstitutionalized, privatized services

wages. Emphasizing

this

human

paradox,

suffered

still

from frozen

service advocates convinced the governor to

support an increase in funding directly targeted to wages for direct-care staff in residen-

programs. Weld recommended a $15 million increase in compensation for these

tial

workers in his proposed budget for

When

fiscal

1996 but did not lobby for

it.

House Ways and Means Committee cut the increase from the budget,
public policy debate took place very briefly. Committee chairman Representative
the

Thomas Finneran argued

could not earmark funding for privately run

that the legislature

agencies working under state contracts because

funding and public control; in
rights to determine

Globe
if

wage

effect,

it

would "cross a

line"

between public

such a provision would violate private owners'

levels for their employees.

editorialized the following

the

day

that

"modest

Responding

to the cut, the

raises for these

Boston

workers are essential

the state departments of Mental Health and Mental Retardation are serious about

providing quality care in humane settings, the goal of institutionalization." Rejecting
Finneran's view that public financing of

making about working
buyer of these

conditions, the

human

Globe

services did not permit public decision

editorial maintained:

services, cannot escape accountability just because

ployed by nonprofit agencies." 25 This view mirrored
providers

who

that of the

"The

state,

the sole

workers are em-

union and those private

lobbied for an increase in wages for direct-care workers.

In any case, an important public policy question had been raised and debated: in an
era of entrepreneurial government, namely, Will public funding decisions include policies

and practices

that affect the workforce,

and

will private

employers

who

contract

with the state be accountable to government as the ultimate employer?

An
state

existing public policy requires the state to set wages for private employees on
and federal construction projects where the "prevailing wage" rate and other labor

regulations are required.

Some

public policy advocates concerned about the expansion

of low-wage jobs in the service sector, including the
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human

service sector, have urged
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new

the Clinton administration to develop a

social contract that

would include these

workers just as the Roosevelt administration created a social contract with private-sector

employers and unionized industrial workers

in the

New

Deal

era.

26

The idea of joint lobbying remained an important part of the union's case for creatnew partnership and for extending the precedent of minimum wage and prevailing
wage laws to the privately employed human service workforce. Sandy Felder believed
that the legislature might look more favorably on a salary increase for direct-care workers if labor and management presented a united front.
As the forum discussions continued, the word spread rapidly throughout the human
service world and, according to Hubie Jones, providers kept well informed on the discussions. Ultimately, "the human service providers of power and substance" would need
ing a

be part of a successful partnership, but their absence did not discredit the process.

to

They knew what was going on

at the table,

"We had

Jones explained.

their attention

even though they were not there in the room."

On two

occasions, the Massachusetts Council of

paper carried front page reports of the

Boyce Slayman

criticize council director

council

affairs.

clear, firm

Human

Services Providers' news-

McCormack Forum, which

led

According to Slayman, one group wanted the council

antiunion posture," but there

some members

to

for giving the union too prominent a place in
to "take a

was another group who wanted

very

"the council to

explore and investigate."

During the early months of 1995 the forum discussion led to substantial work in
drafting the basis for a cooperative agreement or partnership.

A

Model Committee

de-

veloped a document that set out issues to be addressed in contract negotiations. Once

some providers became convinced

that the

union could indeed "add value" to their

workplace, they wanted to forge ahead to contract negotiations. However, the union was
careful not to undertake any actual bargaining in
It

did,

advance of recognition by the workers.

however, orient the providers about the negotiation process and discuss what

kinds of topics could be brought up in bargaining.

The Model Committee's

first draft

agreement included eight principles intended to

be the basis of an agreement that private providers would be asked
that the parties

engaged

in developing the

other" during the process, nor
in the process or single out

employees.

A

issue of unionization so that
free

from fear of

agreement

at

would the union publicize the

number
its

5,

effort to organize its

required that providers not take a position on the

employees could "form their own opinions, pro or con,

retaliation. Point

number. 6 allowed for any party

any time with notice to the other." That

recalled, afforded the parties a

pledged

participation of any agency

any participating agency for an unusual

critical point,

to sign. It

agreement would not "publicly attack each

to terminate the

first draft, facilitator

Elaine

Werby

chance to learn how to talk to one another and how to

handle the most controversial issues.

The Model Committee moved ahead and produced another draft document in April.
this point, Werby pointed out, some of the wrangling over formal, legal issues receded as an atmosphere of greater respect and trust emerged. This draft proposed a
consortium of providers who would sign an agreement to cooperate with the union and
with each other on a whole range of issues. This fascinating document took another
At

approach to the key question of employer neutrality during the unions' organizing

ef-

The proposed language stated that employers would regard union organizing
"with the same spirit of neutrality in which the present providers participate [that is,
the Human Services Workforce Forum]."
forts.
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The proposed agreement addressed some

by federal labor law

difficult issues raised

about the process of labor-management cooperation prior to the actual signing of a
collective bargaining agreement.

The

draft indicated that nothing in the cooperative

arrangement, especially specific terms of wages, hours, work rules, and so forth, could

be negotiated until workers voted for representation by a union.

The proposed model agreement identified those issues to be "jointly decided" by
management and labor and clarified the prerogatives of each party. It recommended
worker participation in decision making at the agency level, and "client involvement in
decision making about workplace issues." The document also proposed a provider/
union training and recruitment fund. In addition, it identified management rights, including "business decisions" such as expansion and contraction, standard for intake of
clients, codes of ethics and behavior, and "all practices not specifically identified in
consortium agreements."

One employer's

expression of great concern about the right to

discipline, suspend, or terminate

employees provoked much discussion; providers com-

plained that unions defended

grievants, including taking cases to costly arbitration

hearings.

all

The proposed agreement

reflected the union's willingness to engage in

new

approaches to "fair problem solving," which allowed for alternatives to the "standard
contractual grievance procedure." Indeed, the parties envisioned recourse to such a

procedure "only

the agreed-to procedure has not

if

Frank believed that

The agreement

this

was a

fulfilled." Facilitator Murray
on the part of the union.

been

crucial sign of flexibility

established terms under

which the union could contact workers

participating agencies without opposition or harassment

at the

by agency management or

board of directors. Significantly, the agreement required providers to recognize the
union

if

a majority of workers elected to join by signing cards. To avoid the long delay

between the organization drive and the
agreement included card-check

official election

of union representation, the

Workers would sign cards indicating

certification.

their

choice of Local 509 as bargaining agent, and the cards would be held and counted by a

would follow agreed-on procedures to validate and tabulate the
The Catholic Labor Guild in Boston, which has promoted union education
and labor-management cooperation for decades, was chosen to fill this role. (The guild

neutral third party that
signatures.

often conducts union elections and card checks as an alternative to the

NLRB.)

If a

majority of workers signed cards, the parties agreed to negotiate a multiemployer contract,

thus avoiding the

common problem

of employers' refusal to negotiate a

first

con-

tract.

Once

the

Model Committee completed

its

report, the next step

was

to

move into the
One soon

recognition process. Five provider agencies initially decided to go forward.

its director became seriously ill and no replacement was sent to
The four who continued to meet into the fall of 1995 were Michael Haran,
executive director of the Cambridge and Somerville Cooperative Apartment Project
(CASCAP), Cambridge; Chuck Howard, executive director of Cooperative Human Ser-

dropped out because
this group.

vices,

Maiden;

Tom

Riley, executive director of Better

Community

Living,

New

Bedford; and Larry Urban, executive director of the Renaissance Club, Lowell.

During the

fall

the providers

to help formulate their position.

who remained

in the process

decided to retain a lawyer

Attorney Frederick Misilo had served as assistant and

deputy commissioner of the Department of Mental Retardation and as the executive
director of a unionized

human

service agency.

He

represented a

providers opposed to collaboration with the union, but he

number of nonunion

was quite open

to the notion

of facilitating a partnership with Local 509 and interested providers. Beginning in early
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September, Misilo began offering the active providers legal counsel on "reaching some
sort

how

of an agreement regarding

to allow

SEIU

to

communicate with

their

employ-

ees."

To Misilo the proposed partnership seemed

to hold out the

could stay in the mental health and retardation

fields

promise that workers

and do good work, "to view work-

ing with people with disabilities as a career," not as "transitional" employment. For this
to

happen, working conditions and economic benefits would have to be "significant

enough"

to attract workers to the field as a career. Until Misilo

became involved,

the

providers lacked the ability to negotiate with the union as a unified group. During the
fall,

they, like the union,

tion stage

formed a united

more quickly under

and discussions moved to the negotia-

front,

the guidance of mediator

Massachusetts Boston professor

who

The dialogue focused on a number of outstanding
consumers in a future partnership. The agency
workforce responsive
that

to particular

consumers present through

ships,

and

skills.

In

many

David Matz, a University of
program in dispute resolution.

directs the graduate

issues, including the welfare of

directors

emphasized the importance of a

and constantly evolving needs and circumstances

different phases of

development

cases boundaries are blurred

in their lives, relation-

— consumers

in

some

cases do

paid work for the service provider and are eligible for union membership; some con-

sumers
live in

live

with foster families

group homes with

who

staff that

are compensated for their expenses, while others

changes with every

shift or is

only on

site at certain

times to assist with certain activities like cooking or shopping. Consumers often need
care tailored to their particular needs, so both workers and providers face a major chal-

lenge in meeting those needs, offering them an exciting opportunity to exercise creativity

and

insight.

Several providers

make conscious

efforts to involve

consumers

in decision-making

processes ranging from choice of everyday activities to agency governance. The providers' attorney

expressed the concern as follows: "The consumer should be

at the table

with the employers and employees in the negotiating process." The interest of the con-

sumers should "serve
tionship." This

is

as a focal point to the definition of the

employer-employee

rela-

"what brings the employer and employee together," unlike an "auto

factory where the goal is to make a machine." If, Misilo maintained, the interaction
between employee and the consumer "is dominated by the employees' concerns and

all

the things that are traditionally part of a collective bargaining agreement, then the con-

sumer

is

potentially shortchanged."

reached between the

an important and

state

He

added, however, that a previous agreement

and the employees'

vital part to

alliance recognized that

consumers "have

play in the negotiation process and the collective bargain-

ing agreement."

Sandy Felder, having been

part of the state labor negotiations that

empowered con-

sumers, argued that consumer interests could be protected in a collective bargaining

framework. She and other union participants in the process emphasized their respect for
the needs of consumers and their families and the desire of these people for control over
significant aspects of their

own

lives.

The

rights the unions achieve for workers should

not negate consumers' rights, according to Felder. She believes that consumers should

have input into hiring and assignments as long as the worker has due process

in person-

nel actions like discipline and termination.

Although some of these larger issues remained unresolved, the parties moved in
November toward an agreement based on the April Model Committee Report. Four
providers signed the final version of the partnership agreement on December 14, 1995.
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To John Sweeney, the president of SEIU, newly elected to the presidency of the naAFL-CIO on a reform program, the creation of a new partnership signified a new
environment for cooperation in which a "mutually beneficial peace can grow." Edward
Malloy, who succeeded Sandy Felder as president of Local 509, offered his support and
emphasized the precedence of the agreement that "allows workers to decide whether
they want to unionize without any influence from their employer."
tional

Consequences
In January 1996,

SEIU Local

509, with financial support from the international union,

sent out organizers to contact the employees of the four providers

who had

formally

agreed to remain neutral. The December agreement provided for access to workers by

union representatives on nonwork time, but
tions

were required

to sort out

when

the organizing drive began, negotia-

what access would mean. One agency did not allow

union organizers in the group homes during breaks, arguing that consumer privacy would

be violated. In any case, the union gained access to work either through the workplace
or

home

visits.

In February a sizable majority of workers signed cards requesting repre-

by SEIU and another group in a third agency followed suit in April. However,
difficulties ensued in CASCAP as the union accused the director of failing to honor the
neutrality provision of the December agreement. The union petitioned for an NLRB
election at CASCAP, and on May 10, 1996, the union prevailed by a single vote.
That month Michael Gallagher, the SEIU staff person consistently involved in the
sentation

1995 negotiations, submitted a grant to the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service

(FMCS)

to fund the partnership and provide staff for the consortium to facilitate coopbetween labor and management. Negotiations between the union and the four
providers began in the summer of 1996, with the grant proposal designed in part to help
facilitate the process and promote "interest-based bargaining"
a more cooperative

eration

—

approach to bargaining

—

instead of "position-based bargaining"

approach in which each party begins negotiations with a

October 1996 the partnership received the grant from the

list

—

the adversarial

of explicit demands. In

FMCS

and in 1997 hired

staff

persons to facilitate the cooperative work.

The formal

negotiations between the union and the providers have not yet produced

a master agreement.

It

has been difficult to agree on a

common

set

of wage provisions

for agencies with different workforces located in different parts of the state and with
different funding sources

and vastly different wage scales determined by local labor

markets. Without the participation of

many more

agencies and employees, bargainers

have been unable to realize the economies of scale
costs of

employee benefits has been

difficult

first

envisioned.

because insurance

Even pooling

rates vary

the

from one area

to another.

What

are the prospects for extending the partnership forged in 1995?

of the Providers' Council

is

Boyce Slayman

sympathetic to the need of the workforce for adequate com-

good working conditions, but he said that many providers reject
Many want to wait to see the outcome of
the union's innovations in labor-management relations. Slayman believes the discussions of a "new model," a "non-aggression pact," means "just laying down the weapons, not fighting." But he is still not sure that the agreement is "truly a new kind of
partnership." The Service Employees International Union has traditionally represented
pensation, benefits, and
the

way

they think unions conduct business.
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workers and, he said, "there

is

no history of the SEIU expressing concern

for the

what Boyce Slayman called "the providers' fears that ultimately there will be more
energy spent on grievance processes for bad employees than there will be on innovative
models of care
its

new model

delivery."
to

Chuck Howard agrees

agency managers

who

that the union has

had

difficulty selling

believe that a labor contract will prevent them

who abuse people

or don't treat them with respect." This, he
The employers can help the union, but it has "to
shed that skin" in order for the process to move on. Howard remained active in the
forum after some providers left because he saw real possibilities of labor-management
cooperation in other sectors of the economy, which allowed both employers and unions

from getting

thinks,

is

rid

of "people

the union's

main

liability.

to improve.

The

future of the partnership

and

its

approach to new providers depends, among

other things, on addressing the problem of discipline and termination in the workplace

—

to put

it

negatively

offers a

— and

staff

development and improvement

both labor and management agree that the

positively. Ultimately,

—

to put the issue

human

service field

chance to create a new, less adversarial model of labor relations. Mediator

David Matz argued that providers should accept the inevitability of conflict in the workplace and seek effective means of resolving disputes over employee performance. SEIU
spokesperson Nancy Mills agreed and offered to present "ten different examples" of
how contracts could be written to enhance flexibility and accountability, improve performance, and allow for just-cause terminations. "We can devise processes that don't
put the union in the position of defending the worst, but we're concerned about fairness
and due process." In most union contracts a just-cause principle strikes a balance between the interests of management and labor because such a clause can be used to hold
"management to a high standard of consistency" and to avoid arbitrary terminations and
punishments. The old model of labor conflict over discipline and discharge cases could
be transcended, Mills maintained, but those innovations would have to be "joint solutions" emerging from real contract negotiations.
The providers' legal counsel, Frederick Misilo, thinks the big question ahead lies
with the other employers, like those he represents who are still "zealously opposed to
collaboration." But if the focus turns to workforce development, he thinks there are
opportunities for cooperation even though public employee unions are still not popular.
"There

is

a great deal of insecurity"

workforce out there

.

.

.

among human

service workers. "This large

does not have pensions and

buy long-term insurance," he adds. "People

who

are

[is]

not in a large enough pool to

working

in

.

.

.

human

services

shouldn't be forced into poverty."

Larry Urban hoped a partnership could improve "the identity of the whole

human

some 1 ,200 providers whose identity as a group is not well
defined in the public's mind. And, he adds, there is the lingering "stigma" attached by
the public to those who worked in the field of mental illness and mental retardation. So
a partnership with the union "may provide a vehicle for finally making some real impact on the public and legislative perception of what human services are all about" as
well as "providing some base for the funding of these programs."
SEIU Local 509 followed through with its commitment to seek salary increases for
direct-care workers in private agencies, even though very few of those workers belonged
to the union. In 1995 its efforts in the legislature focused on creating an enforceable
minimum wage for direct-care workers. The legislature ordered a study of the wage
rates in the industry, which appeared in January 1996 and recommended a $12 million
services field." There are
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increase in compensation for direct-care workers earning less than $20,000 per year.

The governor proposed

this increase in his

received a 4 percent raise.

employed

privately

director of the

budget, and thousands of direct-care workers

The union had helped

direct-care workers'

wage

to raise the issue of

compensation for

in the legislature. Eileen Haggerty, the

SEIU Community Care Workers Campaign,

believes the legislative cam-

paign made this group of neglected employees far more visible to lawmakers. In her
view, the traditional lobbying by the providers aimed at increasing

ing without explicitly identifying the needs of the workers.

human

service fund-

Minimum wage

laws are, of

by organized labor, notably in Massachusetts, where the
increased the minimum wage in 1996 over the governor's veto. However, the
campaign for direct-care workers represents a risk for SEIU Local 509,

course, traditionally supported
legislature
legislative

namely, that the workers

who

receive

wage

increases through legislation will be less

responsive to the union's case that workers need collective bargaining and union representation to improve their situation.
It is

efit

too early to

from the

know whether

legislative

approach

Employees International Union will benwage improvement. Indeed, it is too soon to tell

the Service

to

whether the Partnership for Quality Care will be able to create a lasting multiemployer
agreement with a union or whether that approach will draw other providers into a relationship with the union. Resistance to unionism remains strong

heads. In

man

New

Bedford, for example, where

services agencies, the union filed

one employer

that

SEIU Local 509

numerous

was held responsible for

among many agency

has been organizing hu-

unfair labor practice charges against

illegal labor practices

by the National Labor

Relations Board.

Whatever the

fate of the experimental

workforce problems will increase
affected

model proposed by SEIU Local 509,

in the privatized

human

services, especially as

by cost cutting and other practices required by managed

largest private

human

care.

The head

it is

of the

service agency in Massachusetts, a strong foe of unions, has ar-

gued that cost savings are essential to the health of the industry, which should embrace
managed care. 27
The managed care trend is supposed to increase consumer choice and lower costs,
but it also drastically affects the quality of care provided by human service workers and
the conditions under which they provide that care. Pressure to degrade professionals,
de-skill occupations, reduce benefits, and expand part-time employment will no doubt
be accelerated by managed care as part of the drive to cut costs and increase productivity. There is some movement toward unionization of doctors and other employees of
health maintenance organizations affected adversely by cost cutting and other results of
managed care. Doctors who are employees rather than private practitioners have increased from 24 percent of the medical profession to an estimated 42 percent; some of
these physicians are choosing union representation and collective bargaining because they
are frustrated "at their loss of decision
restrict

hours

what doctors can

after surgery."

tell

making" and from new demands

like

"gag rules that

patients about treatments to the practice of releasing patients

28

managed care are appearing in human service agencies. RepresenSEIU Local 509 have been emphasizing the problems of human service workers'
facing the impact of managed care. In March 1996 the union was approached by a group
of human service professionals who were discontented with the pressures caused by
managed care. The clinicians at the Tri-City agency in Medford, Massachusetts, led an
Similar responses to

tatives of

effort to unionize,

and a year

later a majority

of the agency's 270 employees chose
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SEIU Local 509

in an election supervised

by the NLRB. This

is

a traditional example of

one group of employees organizing one employer and then negotiating

its

own

contract,

which may involve a historic adversarial relationship between workers and employers.
Unions like Local 509 will continue to represent workers in these situations, but it is
unlikely that the bulk of the growing low-wage workforce in the human service industry
will be represented as a result of organizing and bargaining based on single units or
agencies.

The partnership created by SEIU Local 509 and four providers attempted a different,
It seems unlikely, however, that this new model can survive and expand without supportive public policies. In 1933 federal labor legislation, the National
cooperative route.

Recovery Act, demonstrated how public policies could be developed to prominimum wage rates and conditions of employment so that small
employers were not forced to keep wages low and reduce benefits in order to remain
Industrial

vide codes affecting

competitive.

When

the

Supreme Court ruled the

NIRA

unconstitutional in 1935,

Con-

gress enacted the National Labor Relations Act to provide federal support for union
representation and collective bargaining for private employees.

And

in

1936 Congress

adopted a public policy based on the principle that private employers receiving public
revenues could be regulated by the government: the Walsh-Healey Public Contracts Act
(sponsored by a senator and a congressman from Massachusetts) extended federal regulations, including

hours and other terms of employment, to employees working on gov-

ernment contracts.
Like the New Deal federal labor policies, public policies at the state level could
promote collective bargaining and interest-based negotiations by ensuring that workers
have a chance to be represented. For example, in the spring of 1997, SEIU Local 509
filed a bill in the Massachusetts Legislature to remove any disadvantage in bidding for
state contracts

The

bill

from employers engaged

— House 2118, Senate 587 —

in collective bargaining with their employees.

also proposed increased pay for longevity, to

decrease turnover, and better pay for night-shift workers.

But public policies could do more than regulate wages; they could promote workforce development

by encouraging

the creation of joint efforts to solve workplace prob-

lems, to improve employee training, to ensure employee

stability, to

advance quality

promote the importance and public appreciation of the human services and
the workers who provide those services. This study of a labor-management partnership
care,

and

to

suggests that

more can be done

to

advance the general welfare of the human service

workforce with union involvement than has been done without

on the assumption that the quality of care
increases in

human

it.

If

work

life

service agencies, the partnership described here could well be a

prototype for future government-sponsored collaboration. Although

human

policy-makers act

will increase only if the quality of

many workers

in

employed by private agencies, its funding is largely
drawn from public revenues distributed by the government. It is therefore legitimate for
public policies to shape and regulate the conditions under which that workforce can be

the

service workforce are

fully trained, adequately supported,

and

fairly

compensated,

d*

The research for this study was supported by a grant from the Center for Social Policy
Research of the John W. McCormack Institute of Public Affairs, University of Massachusetts Boston. I thank Dr. Murray Frank, a senior fellow at the institute, who asked that the
Labor Resource Center undertake this investigation. His support and critical attention,
along with that of institute fellow Dr. Elaine Werby, have been important. This article
relies on the interviews Laurie Dougherty conducted with members of the partnership.
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